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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge. 
 
The issue in this case is whether mere possession of a 
firearm by a previously convicted felon is a "crime of 
violence" that triggers an obligation of federal prison 
authorities to notify local authorities upon an inmate's 
release. We answer that question in the negative and 
correspondingly hold that a Bureau of Prisons Program 
Statement to the contrary represents an incorrect 
interpretation of the relevant notification statute. 
 
Petitioner Zuliken S. Royce was incarcerated in the 
federal correctional institution at McKean, Pennsylvania 
when he filed this habeas corpus petition. He had been 
convicted in the United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Florida on two counts -- possession of a firearm 
by a convicted felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 922(g)(1), 
and unlawful possession of a machine gun in violation of 
18 U.S.C. S 922(o)(1). Although there were two counts, only 
one gun was involved. Petitioner had previously been 
convicted in state court on three felony drug charges and 
one count of second degree attempted burglary. 
 
According to the presentence investigation report for the 
current conviction, on February 10, 1993 Secret Service 
agents investigating a trail of counterfeit money contacted 
petitioner at his business location. Petitioner denied 
knowledge of counterfeiting activity and consented to a 
search of the premises. At that point, he announced that he 
had a "Mac 10" under his desk for protection. The agents 
retrieved an unloaded RPB Industries M10, 9 millimeter 
machine gun from under the desk. They found no 
ammunition on the premises. 
 
Following his conviction and incarceration, prison 
authorities classified petitioner as having committed 
"crimes of violence" pursuant to a definition of that term 
contained in the Federal Bureau of Prison's internal 
Program Statement No. 5162.02(7). As a result, he became 
subject to 18 U.S.C. S 4042(b), which requires the Bureau 
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to notify local law enforcement authorities of the imminent 
release of inmates who had committed violent crimes and 
provide their names, criminal history, parole restrictions, 
and proposed residence. 
 
Arguing that his offenses of conviction were not "crimes 
of violence," petitioner objected to this classification. After 
his appeals through the administrative process proved 
unsuccessful, petitioner filed this habeas corpus action in 
the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania. He alleged that the Bureau exceeded its 
authority in classifying his offenses as "crimes of violence" 
and in creating Program Statement 5162.02. Petitioner 
specifically asked the court to enter a declaratory judgment 
that he was "eligible for the non-application of 18 U.S.C. 
S 4042[b]." 
 
A magistrate judge recommended that the petition be 
denied for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. She reasoned 
that, under the traditional test for habeas corpus 
jurisdiction, petitioner failed to "make any colorable 
allegation that his underlying conviction is invalid or that 
he is otherwise being denied his freedom from unlawful 
incarceration." Despite the petition's specific request, the 
magistrate judge did not rule on the declaratory relief 
aspect. The district judge adopted the recommendation and 
dismissed the petition. 
 
I. 
 
This court has jurisdiction to review the denial of a 
habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 and our review is 
plenary. United States ex rel. Schiano v. Luther, 954 F.2d 
910, 912 (3d Cir. 1992). The pro se petition here challenges 
application of section 4042(b)'s notification requirement, 
but not the fact or duration of confinement. See Preiser v. 
Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 484-85 (1973). Insofar as the 
district court found that it did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction under traditional 28 U.S.C. S 2241 analysis, the 
ruling was correct. 
 
The label placed on a petition, however, is not 
determinative. As stated in Graham v. Broglin, 922 F.2d 
379, 382-83 (7th Cir. 1991), if a petition asks for habeas 
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corpus relief when petitioner "should have brought a civil 
rights suit, all he has done is mislabel his suit, and either 
he should be given leave to plead over or the mislabeling 
should simply be ignored." See also Fierro v. Gomez, 77 
F.3d 301, 305 (9th Cir. 1996) (a court may construe a 
section 1983 complaint as a habeas petition and vice 
versa), vacated on other grounds, 117 S.Ct. 285 (1996). This 
admonition is especially weighty in pro se litigation. See 
United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Brierley, 414 F.2d 552, 
555 (3d Cir. 1969) (petition prepared by a prisoner may be 
inartfully drawn and should be read "with a measure of 
tolerance"). 
 
An inmate cannot avoid the exhaustion requirements 
that may be a prerequisite to a habeas corpus action by 
characterizing his suit as a civil rights complaint. Where 
exhaustion is not implicated, however, the case should not 
be dismissed until other legitimate avenues of relief are 
considered. Here, petitioner had already exhausted 
available administrative appeals and we conclude that his 
petition should have been construed as an action seeking a 
declaratory judgment under 28 U.S.C. SS 1331 and 2201. 
 
Rather than remanding for consideration as such by the 
district court, we will address the merits of the petition. We 
do so in the interest of judicial efficiency because there are 
no factual disputes, the issue presented is purely a 
question of law, and both parties have briefed the merits. 
See, e.g., Gibson v. Scheidemantel, 805 F.2d 135, 139 (3d 
Cir. 1986). Moreover, the issue is one frequently recurring 
that should be addressed at this time. 
 
II. 
 
The notification provision, 18 U.S.C. S 4042(b), requires 
the Bureau of Prisons to notify local law enforcement 
officials of the release of a prisoner who was"convicted of 
a crime of violence (as defined in section 924(c)(3))."1 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. 8 U.S.C. S 4042 provides in pertinent part: 
 
       (b) "Notice of release of prisoners.- (1) At least 5 days prior to 
the 
       date on which on a prisoner described in paragraph (3) is to be 
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S 4042(b)(3)(B). In turn, 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(3) defines a 
crime of violence as "an offense that is a felony and -- 
 
       (A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
       threatened use of physical force against the person 
       or property of another, or 
 
       (B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that 
       physical force against the person or property of 
       another may be used in the course of committing 
       the offense." 
 
The firearm possession violations do not require proof of 
"use, attempted use, or threatened use" as an element of 
the crime. Thus, subsection (A) has no application to the 
circumstances of this case; only subsection (B) is relevant. 
See United States v. Canon, 993 F.2d 1439, 1441 (9th Cir. 
1993). We review the Bureau's interpretation of subsection 
(B) for consistency with the plain language of the statute 
and pertinent case law. Roussos v. Menifee, 122 F.3d 159, 
163-64 (3d Cir. 1997). 
 
The term "crime of violence" is an important component 
of a number of statutes. In addition to the cross-reference 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
       released on supervised release, . . . written notice of the release 
. . . 
       shall be provided to the chief law enforcement officer of the State 
       and of the local jurisdiction in which the prisoner will reside. 
Notice 
       prior to release shall be provided by the Director of the Bureau of 
       Prisons. . . . The notice requirements under this subsection do not 
       apply in relation to a prisoner being protected under chapter 224. 
 
       (2) A notice under paragraph (1) shall disclose- 
        (A) the prisoner's name; 
        (B) the prisoner's criminal history, including a description of 
the 
        offense of which the prisoner was convicted; and 
        (C) any restrictions on conduct or other conditions to the 
       release of the prisoner that are imposed by law, the sentencing 
       court, or the Bureau of Prisons or any other Federal agency. 
 
       (3) A prisoner is described in this paragraph if the prisoner was 
       convicted of - 
        (A) a drug trafficking crime, as that term is defined in section 
       924(c)(2); or 
       (B) a crime of violence (as defined in section 924(c)(3)). 
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contained in the notification statute, the "crime of violence" 
concept is relevant to: 
 
       1) the United States Sentencing Guidelines, especi ally 
       when determining career criminal status and its 
       related sentence enhancement, U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1; 
 
       2) 18 U.S.C. S 924(e)(1), which assigns, inter alia, a 
       fifteen year mandatory minimum sentence to a felon 
       with three prior convictions for violent felonies; and 
 
       3) 18 U.S.C. S 3621(e)(2)(B), which by negat ive 
       inference excludes inmates who committed violent 
       offenses from eligibility for a sentence reduction 
       following completion of a substance abuse treatment 
       program. 
 
Unfortunately, the courts and the Bureau have complicated 
matters by using varying definitions of "crime of violence" 
and related terms without exploring the possibility and 
desirability of a more uniform approach. 
 
The convictions at issue here are limited to firearm 
possession. This Court has yet to discuss whether this 
violation is a crime of violence under the notification 
statute, although we have encountered the offense in other 
settings. The Bureau, in its Program Statement No. 
5162.02(7), takes the position that violations of the firearm 
possession prohibitions are crimes of violence in all 
instances. We assess the validity of that approach by first 
examining related contexts where the terminology is 
relevant. 
 
(1.) Sentencing Guidelines 
 
The term "crime of violence" is defined in the Sentencing 
Guidelines. Because that formulation has been the subject 
of substantial litigation in the federal courts and is used 
most frequently, we first examine the term in the guidelines 
context. 
 
Sentencing Guideline section 4B1.1 provides for 
enhanced terms of incarceration for those convicted of a 
"crime of violence." Such an offense is described in section 
4B1.2(a) as a felony that (1) has as an element"the use, 
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attempted use, or threatened use" of physical force or (2) is 
a "burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use 
of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents `a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.' " 
 
The original commentary to section 4B1.2 created a 
conflict among various Courts of Appeals over the question 
of whether mere possession of a firearm by a felon was a 
crime of violence. See Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 
39 n.1 (1993) (citing United States v. Williams, 892 F.2d 296 
(3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Goodman, 914 F.2d 696 
(5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Alvarez, 914 F.2d 915 (7th 
Cir. 1990); United States v. Cornelius, 931 F.2d 490 (8th 
Cir. 1991); United States v. O'Neal, 937 F.2d 1369 (9th Cir. 
1990); and United States v. Walker, 930 F.2d 789 (10th Cir. 
1991)). In 1992, the United States Sentencing Commission 
amended the commentary to section 4B1.2 to clarify that 
" `[c]rime of violence' does not include the offense of 
unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon." See U.S.S.G. 
S 4B1.2 Application Note 1. 
 
In Stinson, the Supreme Court confirmed the binding 
effect of this amendment and held that "[f]ederal courts 
may not use the felon in possession offense as the predicate 
crime of violence for purposes of imposing the career 
offender provisions of U.S.S.G. S 4B1.1 . . .." 508 U.S. at 
47. Thus, in the sentencing guideline setting, an 
authoritative ruling holds that mere firearm possession by 
a convicted felon is not a crime of violence. See also United 
States v. Sahakian, 965 F.2d 740, 742 (9th Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Johnson, 953 F.2d 110, 115 (4th Cir. 
1991). 
 
(2.) Armed Career Criminal 
 
Under 18 U.S.C. S 924(e), a mandatory minimum 
sentence must be imposed on a felon in possession of a 
firearm who has three previous convictions "for a violent 
felony." The statute defines "violent felony" as one that "has 
as an element use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force" or is a burglary, arson, or extortion, involves 
use of explosives, "or otherwise involves conduct that 
presents serious potential risk of physical injury." 
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S 924(e)(2)(B). This definition uses the identical pertinent 
language found in Sentencing Guideline section 4B1.2.2 
 
In United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221 (1st Cir. 1992), the 
Court considered whether conviction under section 
922(g)(1) (possession of firearms by a felon) was a proper 
predicate offense for imposing the armed career criminal 
provision of section 924(e). Judge Breyer, writing for the 
Court, held that the offense was not a "violent felony" under 
the statute, and commented that "simple possession of a 
firearm does not fit easily within the literal language of the 
statute." Id. at 224. 
 
Observing that an expansive reading of the language 
would encompass crimes not meant to be included, Doe 
reasoned that the term "violent felony" evoked a "tradition 
of crimes that involve the possibility of more closely related, 
active violence." Id. at 225. The Court also reviewed the 
commentary to U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2, remarking that "because 
uniform interpretation of similar language is in itself 
desirable, we believe we should give some legal weight to 
the Commission's determination" not to include the felon in 
possession offense as a crime of violence. Id. 
 
Two other Courts of Appeals agree that U.S.S.G.S 4B1.2 
and 18 U.S.C. S 924(e) should be read consistently with one 
another. In United States v. Garcia-Cruz, 978 F.2d 537, 
542-43 (9th Cir. 1992), and United States v. Oliver, 20 F.3d 
415, 416 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam), both Courts held, 
after examining Guidelines case law, that the felon in 
possession offense was not a violent felony under section 
924(e). In Oliver, the court noted that the two expressions 
in 18 U.S.C. S 924(e) and U.S.S.G. S 4B1.2 "are not 
conceptually distinguishable for purposes of the narrow 
question raised in this appeal." 20 F.3d at 417. Doe, Oliver, 
and cases that reach a similar conclusion persuasively 
explain why mere possession does not constitute a "crime 
of violence." 
 
We note also that the relevant language in sections 
924(c)(3) and 924(e) differ only in minor detail. Section 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Guideline section 4B1.2 speaks of "burglary of a dwelling," whereas 
section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) designates only "burglary." 
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924(c)(3)(B) speaks of a violation "that by its nature, 
involves a substantial risk that physical force against the 
person or property of another may be used in the course of 
committing the offense." Section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) refers to 
"conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical 
injury to another." The Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit has concluded that possession of a firearm by a 
felon is not a violent crime under either subsection. 
Downey v. Crabtree, 100 F.3d 662, 667 (9th Cir. 1996). We 
agree that the quoted variation in wording does not affect 
the classification of felon in possession offenses. 
 
(3.) Substance Abuse Treatment Program 
 
The sentencing benefits available under the substance 
abuse treatment program, created by the Violent Crime 
Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103- 
322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994), also hinge upon the crime of 
violence concept. The statute, 18 U.S.C. S 3621(e)(2)(B), 
grants the Bureau of Prisons discretion to reduce the period 
of custody up to one year for any "prisoner convicted of a 
nonviolent offense" who successfully completes a substance 
abuse treatment program. 
 
The statute does not define "nonviolent offense." The 
Bureau of Prisons originally, adopted a regulation that 
disqualified inmates whose "current offense is determined 
to be a crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. 
S 924(c)(3)." 28 C.F.R. S 550.58 (1996). In addition, the 
Bureau adopted Program Statement No. 5162.02 (as 
amended April 23, 1996), which excluded from 
participation those inmates convicted of firearm violations 
under specified subsections of 18 U.S.C. S 922, including 
mere possession. In a number of cases, inmates currently 
serving terms for nonviolent offenses (including the felon- 
in-possession offense) contested their classification and 
argued that under 29 C.F.R. S 550.58 and Program 
Statement No. 5162.02, they were improperly being denied 
earned sentence reductions. 
 
The Bureau soon realized that its policy of denying 
sentence reduction based on the questionable classification 
of certain violations as crimes of violence was generating 
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conflicting decisions from the courts. In particular, 
numerous cases addressed the Bureau's classification of 
the felon in possession of a firearm offense. 
 
To resolve the problem, the Bureau amended its 
regulation in October 1997 to delete the disqualification 
based on convictions for "a crime of violence as defined in 
18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(3)." 28 C.F.R. S 550.58. See also 62 Fed. 
Reg. 53690 (Oct. 15, 1997). In relevant part, the current 
regulation now provides: 
 
       (a) As an exercise of the discretion vested in the 
       Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons, the following 
       categories of inmates are not eligible for early release 
       . . . 
 
        (vi) [i]nmates whose current offense is a felony . . . 
       (B) [t]hat involved the carrying, possession, or use of a 
       firearm . . ." 
 
28 C.F.R. S 550.58 (emphasis added). Thus, the current 
regulation no longer classifies the felon in possession of a 
firearm offense as a "crime of violence." This new 
discretionary approach has not yet been incorporated into 
Program Statement 5162.02, but, by deleting the reference 
to "crime of violence," the Bureau effectively made that term 
irrelevant at least in the context of the drug abuse 
treatment statute.3 Cases analyzing the original regulation 
are now mostly of historical interest. A brief review of those 
decisions, however, is in order.4 
 
In the first of these cases, Downey v. Crabtree, 100 F.3d 
662 (9th Cir. 1996), the Court held that the Bureau was 
not permitted to use a sentence enhancement imposed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The notification statute, in contrast, contains an explicit reference 
to 
"crime of violence." Thus, the Program Statement still includes that 
classification. 
 
4. Several district courts within this Circuit had concluded that a felon 
in possession offense was a crime of violence justifying a denial of 
sentence reduction. Those opinions, however, preceded the change in the 
Bureau's regulations and of course would not be binding on this court. 
See Piccolo v. Lansing, 939 F. Supp. 319 (D. N.J. 1996); Paydon v. 
Hawk, 960 F. Supp. 867 (D. N.J. 1997); Snisky v. Pugh, 974 F. Supp. 
817 (M.D. Pa. 1997). 
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under the Guidelines to transform what was otherwise 
a nonviolent felony (possession of 100 grams of 
methamphetamine) into a crime of violence.5 
 
Downey explicitly rejected the government's argument 
"that Congress' omission of a definition for`nonviolent 
offense' in S 3621(e)(2)(B) suggests an intention to entrust 
defining that term entirely to the Bureau of Prisons' 
discretion." Id. at 666. While the Bureau properly used its 
rulemaking authority to promulgate a regulation defining 
"nonviolent felony" as the converse of the section 924(c)(3) 
crime of violence definition, it could not reinterpret the term 
contrary to the established authority built up around the 
section 924(c)(3) definition. See id. at 668. 
 
A subsequent opinion from the same Court reinforced 
this approach. Davis v. Crabtree, 109 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 
1997), held that the crime of conviction -- felon in 
possession of a firearm -- was a nonviolent offense and that 
the Bureau's characterization to the contrary could not be 
used to deny a sentence reduction. Id. at 567. 
 
Crabtree v. Jacks, 114 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 1997), 
sustained the Bureau's decision to deny a sentence 
reduction, but presented substantially different facts than 
either Downey or Davis. In Jacks, although their current 
convictions (including a felon in possession offense) were 
nonviolent, the inmates had previously been convicted 
of concededly violent crimes. Id. at 984. In these 
circumstances, the Court held that the Bureau's 
interpretation which encompassed previous convictions was 
sustainable because the substance abuse statute did not 
specify whether "nonviolent felony" was limited only to 
current convictions. Id. at 986. 
 
In Venegas v. Henman, 126 F.3d 760 (5th Cir. 1997), the 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the Bureau's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. Section 9 instructed Bureau officials to examine the "Specific Offense 
Characteristics" noted in the presentence investigation report that aid 
the district court in applying the guidelines. As noted in Downey, the 
Bureau categorically denied early release credit for inmates convicted 
under 18 U.S.C. S 841(a) if they also received a sentence enhancement 
for firearm possession. 100 F.3d at 665. 
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denial of a sentence reduction to an inmate whose current 
conviction included the crimes of felon in possession of a 
firearm and possession with intent to distribute marijuana. 
The Court concluded that section 3621(e) grants the 
Bureau generalized discretion to determine when and how 
to reduce a sentence. Id. at 762. In particular, the court 
refused to interpret "crime of violence" under section 
924(c)(3) in light of the guidelines because sentence 
reduction and sentencing serve different ends. Id. at 763- 
64. In contrast to Venegas, we have noted that an effort to 
determine whether the felon in possession of a firearm 
offense constitutes a crime of violence would be "influenced 
by the career offender provisions of the Sentencing 
Guidelines." Roussos, 122 F.3d at 163 n.5. 
 
Venegas found support in Sesler v. Pitzer, 110 F.3d 569 
(8th Cir. 1997), but that case spoke only to use of a 
firearm, or in dicta, to possession of a firearm during a 
predicate offense. Id. at 571-72. Sesler does not preclude a 
finding that mere possession offenses are nonviolent. 
Moreover, a few months later, the Eighth Circuit took issue 
with Venegas stating, "[h]aving adopted S 924(c)(3) as its 
definitional standard in its [original] regulation, the BOP is 
bound by the definition accorded it in the interpretative 
decisional case law." Martin v. Gerlinski, 133 F.3d 1076, 
1080 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 
We have twice considered the meaning of "nonviolent 
felony" in the substance abuse program context. In Stiver v. 
Meko, 130 F.3d 574 (3d Cir. 1997), an inmate with previous 
convictions for robbery and aggravated assault challenged 
his ineligibility for reduction of his current sentence for 
possession of heroin with intent to distribute. Both of his 
previous convictions, however, clearly qualified as crimes of 
violence under section 924(c)(3), the guidelines and the 
Bureau's regulation. The panel concluded in that situation, 
as did Jacks, that the Bureau could look to the violent 
nature of previous convictions, rather than limiting itself to 
consideration of the current offense only. Id. at 577. 
 
In the other case, Roussos, an inmate was convicted of 
conspiracy to distribute narcotics. 122 F.3d at 160. The 
sentencing court enhanced the period of incarceration 
pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1 because guns were found in 
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the inmate's house some distance from the arrest site. Id. 
In light of the sentence enhancement, the Bureau, as it did 
in Downey, denied eligibility for a sentence reduction 
following the inmate's successful completion of the 
substance abuse program. Id. 
 
Roussos held that the offense of conspiracy to distribute 
narcotics was not a crime of violence and that the provision 
of the Program Statement declaring ineligible all inmates 
with a sentencing enhancement for firearms possession was 
unenforceable. Id. at 164. By focusing on enhancement 
instead of the offense, the Bureau "converted a nonviolent 
crime into a violent one by means of a Program Statement 
that is inconsistent with the language of the statute, and its 
own regulations." Id. at 163. We were persuaded by the 
reasoning in Downey that the Bureau's interpretation of 
section 924(c)(3) ran counter to the Sentencing 
Commission's formulation of a `nonviolent offense' and 
corresponding judicial endorsement. Id. at 162-63. 
 
Stiver was careful to distinguish Roussos. Traditionally, 
the Bureau has been given substantial discretion in 
administering rehabilitation programs and the substance 
abuse program falls within that category. To the extent, 
therefore, that Stiver permits the Bureau to use prior 
convictions as a factor in determining program eligibility, it 
is consistent with that practice. In contrast, the notification 
statute does not serve a rehabilitative purpose. Thus, we 
are not constrained by Stiver and its discussion of the 
Bureau's discretion under the substance abuse program. 
 
III. 
 
It is against this rather complex background that we 
come to the issue posed in the case before us -- whether a 
current conviction for possession of firearms by a felon is a 
"crime of violence" within the scope of the notification 
procedures of 18 U.S.C. S 4042(b). Necessarily, we address 
whether Program Statement No. 5162.02(7) contains a 
correct interpretation of the statutory crime of violence 
definition as it has evolved in the federal courts. 
 
Section (7) of Program Statement No. 5162.02 provides: 
"Criminal Offenses That Are Crimes of Violence In All 
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Cases. Any conviction for an offense listed below should be 
categorized as a `crime of violence.' a. Title 18, United 
States Code . . . S 922 . . . (g), (o). . . (firearms violations)." 
The definition section of Program Statement No. 5110.11, 
which covers "Notification of Release to State/Local Law 
Enforcement," in turn instructs that "clarifying instructions 
to define a `crime of violence' are provided in the Program 
Statement [No. 5162.02]." 
 
Unlike the substance abuse provision, which failed to 
define "nonviolent offense" and thus allowed a regulation to 
fill the gap, the notification statute does not leave 
interpretation to the Bureau. Rather, section 4042(b)(3)(B) 
refers to a specific provision defining of "crime of violence" 
-- that contained in section 924(c)(3). Such an explicit 
reference to a statutory definition demonstrates a 
Congressional intent to forestall interpretation of the term 
by an administrative agency and acts as a limitation on the 
agency's authority. See generally Greenwood Trust Co. v. 
Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 827 (1st Cir. 1992) 
(incorporation by reference to another statute brings the 
statutory language and relevant case law into the 
incorporating statute). 
 
The citation to section 924(c)(3) is unlike other directions 
that appear in the notification statute. For example, section 
4042(b) requires the Bureau to advise local authorities. 
Presumably, the method of notification is left to the 
agency's discretion, e.g., mail, fax, hand-delivery, etc. Such 
flexibility in the means to be employed adds significance to 
the fact that Congress did not leave the crime of violence 
definition similarly open-ended. 
 
Some weight is also due to the state of the law at the 
time Congress enacted S 4042(b). See Greenwood Trust Co., 
971 F.2d at 827. Stinson, Doe, Johnson, Sahkian and 
Garcia-Cruz constituted a formidable body of authority 
construing "crime of violence" and we may assume that the 
lawmakers were aware of these precedents. Thus, the 
Bureau is bound not only by the language of the statutory 
definition, but also by its judicial interpretations. Id. See 
also Dutton v. Wolpoff and Abramson, 5 F.3d 649, 655 (3d 
Cir. 1993). 
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Unlike the situation in Stiver and Jacks, this case does 
not implicate a duly promulgated regulation that purports 
to establish the agency's statutory interpretation of an 
otherwise undefined term. Nor do we owe the Program 
Statement any deference. The notification statute and the 
Program Statement specifically refer to a provision of the 
Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(3), an area in which the 
Bureau has no special competence. See U.S. Dep't of the 
Navy v. FLRA, 840 F.2d 1131, 1134 (3d Cir. 1988) ("no 
deference is owed an agency's interpretation of a general 
statute."). This case is thus unlike Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 
50, 61 (1995), where the Court allowed "some" deference to 
a Program Statement interpreting a statute the Bureau was 
charged with administering. 
 
Although we have not previously addressed application of 
the "crime of violence" terminology to the notification 
provision, we have encountered the phrase in other 
contexts. In United States v. Williams, 892 F.2d 296, 304 
(3d Cir. 1989), a pre-amendment guidelines case, we 
observed that "possessing a gun while firing it. . . is a 
crime of violence; possession without firing the weapon is 
not." Whatever doubt may have existed following the 
guidelines amendment as to the authority of this passing 
remark in Williams6 was removed by United States v. 
Joshua, 976 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1992). In Joshua, where the 
indictment charged defendant with possession of afirearm 
and ammunition, we invoked the terminology of section 
924(e) and the guideline commentary when we stated, 
"[t]here is no conduct alleged that posed `a serious potential 
risk of physical injury to another.' " Id. at 856. Accordingly, 
there was no `crime of violence' upon which to predicate 
application of the Career Offender Act. 
 
As we intimated in Roussos, interpretation of "crime of 
violence" under the Sentencing Guidelines should bear 
upon the meaning of the term in other settings as well. 122 
F.3d at 163 n.5; see also Impounded (Juvenile R.G.), 117 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. Stinson overruled the aspect of Williams that held that the felon in 
possession offense could be a crime of violence under the Guidelines in 
some circumstances. See Stinson, 508 U.S. at 39; see also Williams, 892 
F.2d at 304. 
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F.3d 730, 738 n.13 (3d Cir. 1997). As the Doe Court 
remarked, there is much to be said for attributing the same 
meaning to the same or related words. See 960 F.3d at 225. 
 
Our reading of the statutory language and the thoughtful 
opinions of other Courts of Appeals dissuades us from 
fracturing the meaning of section 924(c)(3)'s crime of 
violence definition. We reach that determination despite the 
Bureau's argument that it should be permitted to vary 
interpretation of the definition because its aims embrace 
different objectives than those of a sentencing judge. 
 
Section 4042(b) requires dissemination of information 
about prisoners released after serving terms for offenses 
that Congress and the courts recognize as crimes of 
violence -- those which traditionally "involve[ ] the 
possibility of more closely related, active violence." United 
States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 225 (1st Cir. 1992). Nothing to 
the contrary appears in the provision's legislative history. In 
short, the Program Statement is not in accord with the 
statutory provisions. 
 
We hold, therefore, that possession of a firearm under 18 
U.S.C. SS 922(g) and (o) is not a crime of violence within the 
terms of 18 U.S.C. S 4042(b) and that Program Statement 
No. 5162.02(7) is an impermissible interpretation of 18 
U.S.C. S 924(c)(3). 
 
Accordingly, the judgment of the district court will be 
reversed. The Board may not subject petitioner to the 
notification requirements because section 4042(b)(3)(B) 
does not justify classification of his current offenses as 
crimes of violence. We remand to the district court with 
directions that it remand to the Bureau of Prisons for 
reclassification of petitioner. 
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